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Use and Abuse of the Laws of War In the
'War on Terrorism"
Marco Sass6li*

Introduction
Unfortunately, war, terrorism, widespread deliberate attacks
against civilians, and violence by non-State actors are not new
phenomena. Neither is it new that groups consider their aim so
noble that it justifies any means or that they deliberately place
themselves outside the existing international order and fight
against that order across national borders. Many (e.g., early
communist) revolutionary or anarchist movements of the past had
universal aims and fought, with very little restraint, against the
existing political and economic (e.g., capitalist and imperialist)
system worldwide.
Traditionally, when the main actors of the international
system, i.e., States, were confronted with such international or
similar, but purely domestic, challenges, the States employed the
first line of defense against the restraints of the laws of wardenying that the laws of war applied, even when the challenge
took on the intensity of an armed conflict. They applied national
criminal laws and tried to deal with the trans-national aspect of
the challenge through judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
They insisted that they were not engaged in hostilities, but in law
enforcement. Although reluctantly, States could not deny that
international human rights law (to the extent that it was not
suspended due to the emergency situation) and domestic
constitutional guarantees applied to the situation.
Three primary rationales may have encouraged the
reluctance to apply the laws of war, which in conformity with
contemporary practice, I prefer to call "international humanitarian
First, States feared internationalizing domestic
law" (IHL).
* Professor of international law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland (until
December 2003: University of Quebec in Montreal (UQAM), Canada). The author
would like to thank Ms. Caroline Buteau and Mr. Joseph Neudorfer, research
assistants at the UQAM, for their valuable research, comments and linguistic
revising of this text. He also thanks Mr. Gabor Rona, Legal Adviser of the
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challenges. Second, even when the challenge clearly transcended
national borders, States feared that recognizing the applicability
of the laws of war would confer a certain status upon their nonState enemy. Under traditional international law, recognition of
belligerency by the affected State meant, in addition, that nonState insurgents became the subjects of all the rights and
obligations provided for by the law of internationalarmed conflicts
and that other States had the rights and obligations of neutral
States.' Third, once triggered, IHL must perforce apply equally to
2
both parties to a conflict; otherwise, it would never be respected.
No State therefore wanted to be placed, if only for the purpose of
applying humanitarian rules, on the same level as that of a nonState actor.
Hopefully, and in conformity with applicable treaty rules, a
State subject to an armed attack by a non-State actor would
recognize that IHL of non-international armed conflicts applied.
That law is less detailed and less protective than IHL of
international armed conflicts and it explicitly states that its
application does not affect the status of the parties. 3 IHL of noninternational armed conflicts does not require, as does that of
international armed conflicts, the classification of enemy persons
(e.g., as prisoners of war) or of territories (e.g., as an occupied
territory), but simply provides fundamental guarantees for all
those who do not, or no longer, directly participate in the

1. Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163/II COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACAD. OF INT'L L. 119, 145 (1979).
2. See Protocol [No. I] Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
Preamble, para. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Protocol I]; MARCO SASSOLI &
ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 83-87, 665, 681, 682 (1999)
(referencing precedents, inter alia, of the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg).
See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between jus ad bellum and
jus in bello, 9 REV. INT'L STUD. 221 (1983); Francois Bugnion, Guerrejuste, guerre
d'agression et droit international humanitaire, 847 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 523
(2002); Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello, 320 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 553 (1997); HENRI MEYROWITZ, LE PRINCIPE DE L'EGALITE DES
BELLIGERANTS DEVANT LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE (1970).

3. Convention [No. I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32
[hereinafter Convention I]; Convention [No. II] for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter Convention II]; Convention
[No. 1II] relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, 136-38 [hereinafter Convention III]; Convention [No. IV] relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 288-90 [hereinafter Convention IV].
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hostilities. 4 It does not (as the law of international armed conflicts
does through the very essence of combatant status and privilege)
hinder the State from punishing, under its domestic legislation, all
those who participate in the hostilities (for the sole fact that they
did so). It simply requires that State punishment comply with
"judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." 5
Since the great shock of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
administration, challenged by the nebula of international
terrorism, personified by Al-Qaeda and Ussama Bin Laden, chose
an entirely different approach.6 It declared, first, that it was
engaged in an international armed conflict. This was entirely
correct as far as hostilities against Afghanistan (or, later, against
Iraq) were concerned. Astonishingly, however, the administration
proceeded to declare that it was engaged in a single worldwide
4. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Convention II, supra note
3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 86-88; Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at
136-38; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 288-90. See generally
Protocol [No. II] Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609-17 [hereinafter Protocol II].
5. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 3(1(d)), 75 U.N.T.S. at 34; Convention II,
supra note 3, art. 3(1(d)), 75 U.N.T.S at 88; Convention III, supra note 3, art.
3(1(d)), 75 U.N.T.S at 138; Convention IV,supra note 3, art. 3(1(d)), 75 U.N.T.S at
290. See Protocol II, supra note 4, at art. 6, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14 (detailing
protections for penal prosecutions).
6. See Anthony Dworkin, Excerpts from an Interview with CharlesAllen, Deputy
General Counsel for InternationalAffairs, U.S. Department of Defense, CRIMES OF
WAR, Dec. 16, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (giving a legal explanation of the U.S. position);
Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Amended Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM), 4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
at
available
2002)
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702grsp.pdf (last visited
Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Padilla Respondents' Response]. Such position was
partly accepted by the courts in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280-81 (4th Cir.
2002), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), but rejected,
concerning a U.S. citizen arrested far away from any conceivable battlefield, in
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2nd Cir. 2003). The U.S. Supreme Court
has still to give its assessment of this theory. See Al Odah v. United States, 321
F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003). See also Joan
Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human
Rights, 14 EUR. J. INVL L. 241, 249 (2003), for a critical assessment of the U.S.
position in particular; Catherine Moore, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the
Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2-6 (2003); Jordan J. Paust,
War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
325 (2003); Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons qua Unlawful
Combatants? The Judicial Safeguards to which Guantdnamo Bay Detainees are
Entitled, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 284, 287-90 (2003); and Michael J. D. Sweeney,
Detention at Guantanamo Bay-A Linguistic Challenge to Law, 30 HUM. RTS. 15,
15-17 (2003).
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international armed conflict against a non-State actor (A1-Qaeda)
or perhaps also against a social or criminal phenomenon
(terrorism) if not a moral category (evil).7 This worldwide conflict
started-without the United States characterizing it as such at
that time-at some point in the 1990s and will continue until
victory. Next, while the United States claims in this conflict all
the prerogatives that IHL of international armed conflicts confers
upon a party to such a conflict (e.g., the right to attack members of
the enemy armed forces as long as they do not surrender, or the
right to detain prisoners of war without any judicial decision until
the end of active hostilities), it denies the enemy the protection
afforded by most of that law.8 Lastly, all those considered to be
involved on the enemy side in the "war on terrorism," even those
who are-rightly or wrongly-denied the benefit of full protection
by IHL of international armed conflicts, are not dealt with under
domestic criminal legislation, any other new or existing
legislation, or international human rights law, because, as the
administration claims, their treatment is entirely and exclusively
ruled by some mysterious rules of customary IHL. 9
Intended as the branch of international law providing
protection to all those affected by or involved in armed conflicts,
IHL has thus become the justification for denying such people and
others any protection afforded by human rights law and domestic
legislation.
I will argue hereafter that all parts of the U.S.
administration's approach I just described are either contrary to
existing international law or correct only for some persons in some
circumstances other than those currently discussed. I will then
briefly deal with the distinct question whether it would be possible
and desirable to elaborate a new law along the lines suggested by
the U.S. administration.
I.

The Qualification of the "War on Terrorism"under
International Humanitarian Law

Currently, IHL is largely codified in treaties, in particular
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions ° and the two 1977 Additional
7. See Paust, supra note 6, at 326-28.
8. See id. at 330-32.
9. American Society of International Law, United States: Response of the United
States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba (April 12, 2002), at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0508.htm#r2 (last visited Feb.
12, 2004).
10. Convention I, supra note 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention II, supra note 3, 75
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Protocols. 1' The United States is a party to the former, but not to
the latter. It recognizes, however, Protocol II as desirable or even
as existing law, 12 and many, but not all, provisions of Protocol I as
The four Geneva
reflecting customary international law. 13
Conventions and Protocol I apply to international armed conflicts.
Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions states that the
Conventions "shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties." 14 Only States can be parties to the
Geneva Conventions. Al-Qaeda, terrorism, or evil are not States.
Therefore, the Geneva Conventions do not apply to a conflict
between the United States and these non-State actors and
amorphous concepts. There is no indication confirming what
seems to be the view of the U.S. administration, i.e., that the
concept of international armed conflict under customary
international law is larger. State practice and opinio juris do not
apply the law of international armed conflict to conflicts between
States and some non-State actors. On the contrary, and in
conformity with the basics of the Westphalian system, States have
always distinguished between conflicts against one another, to
which the whole of IHL applied, and other armed conflicts, to
which States were never prepared to apply those same rules, but
only more limited humanitarian rules.
The law of international armed conflict covers some parts of
the "war on terrorism": all hostilities directed against forces
representing another State (such as Afghanistan) or acting de
facto, under the direction or control of such State' 5 (which may
U.N.T.S 85; Convention III, supra note 3, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Convention IV, supra
note 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287.
11. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol II, supra note 4 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
12. A Message from the President of the United States regarding Protocol II
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, US Government Printing Office,
100th Congress, 1st session, Treaty Doc. 100-2, Washington D.C. (1987), reprinted
in SASSOLI & BOUVIER, supra note 2, at 603-05 (1999).
13. Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position in the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, Address Before the Humanitarian Law Conference, in 2 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 415, 419-30 (1987). At the time Matheson was the Deputy Legal Adviser of
the U.S. State Department.
14. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Convention II, supra
note 3, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Convention III, supra note 3, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at
136; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288. Cf. Protocol I, supra
note 2, arts. 1(3), 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7 (expanding the field of application to
national liberation wars, a position vehemently opposed by the United States).
15. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1540-46 (Int'l Tribunal for the
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have been the case for AI-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, but not
elsewhere). Other parts of that "war" are clearly not covered by
IHL of international armed conflicts. Until now, it was regretted,
mainly by humanitarian organizations, that once there was an
international element to a conflict in a-given territory, the entire
conflict could not be classified as wholly international, but had,
under consistent State practice, to be split off into its
components. 16 Therefore, a worldwide conflict could even less be
characterized as international simply because some of its
components are international.
Each component of the "war on terrorism" has therefore to be
Components that do not qualify as
classified separately.
international armed conflicts may be non-international armed
conflicts, covered by Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions, and by Protocol II. This raises two issues: first,
whether every armed conflict not classified as international is
perforce a non-international armed conflict; and second, when a
situation is sufficiently violent to be termed an "armed conflict."
On the first issue, the wording of the IHL treaties may be
ambiguous. On the one hand, Article 3 common refers to "armed
conflicts not of an international character"'17 and Protocol II refers
to "armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of . . .
(Protocol I),"' 18 two indications that every armed conflict not

qualifying as international is perforce non-international. On the
other hand, Article 3 common refers to conflicts "occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,"' 9 whereas
Protocol II refers to those "which take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party. '20 Does this imply that conflicts between
a High Contracting Party and an armed group, which do not occur
on the territory of that High Contracting Party, but on the
territory of another State, are not non-international armed
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber 1999).
16. Schindler, supra note 1, at 119; Hans-Peter Gasser, InternationalizedNonInternational Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and
Lebanon 33 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 157-60 (1983); James G. Stewart, Towards a single
definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique of
internationalizedarmed conflict, 850 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313, 323-40 (2003);
PRIc DAVID, PRINCIPES DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES 153-60 (3rd ed. 2002).

17. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Convention II, supra
note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 86; Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at
136; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 288.
18. See Protocol II, supra note 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
19. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Convention II, supra
note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 86; Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at
136; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 288.
20. See Protocol II, supra note 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
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conflicts? Or, does it simply recall that according to the principle
of the relative force of treaties, those treaty rules apply only on the
From the
territories of States that have accepted them?
perspective of the aim and purpose of IHL, the latter
interpretation must be correct, as there would otherwise be a gap
in protection, which could not be explained by States' concerns
about their sovereignty. Those concerns made the law of noninternational armed conflicts more rudimentary. Concerns about
State sovereignty could not explain why victims of conflicts
spilling over the territory of several States should benefit from
lesser protection than those affected by conflicts limited to the
territory of only one State. In addition, Articles 1 and 7 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda extend
the jurisdiction of that tribunal called to enforce the law of non21
international armed conflicts to the neighbouring countries. This
confirms that even a conflict spreading across borders remains a
"[I]nternal conflicts are
non-international armed conflict.
conflicts by the parties
armed
from
international
distinguished
22
involved rather than by the territorial scope of the conflict."
As for the lower threshold of an armed conflict, no clear-cut
criteria exist, but relevant factors include: intensity; number of
active participants; number of victims; duration and protracted
character of the violence; organization and discipline of the
parties; capability to respect IHL; collective, open, and coordinated
character of the hostilities; direct involvement of governmental
armed forces (vs. law enforcement agencies); and de facto
authority by the non-State actor over potential victims. 23 In any
case, Protocol II excludes "situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."24 The
U.S. administration adopts a very wide concept of "armed conflict."
Its instructions to Military Commissions explain that it
does not require . . . ongoing mutual hostilities, or a
21. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecutionof Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, U.N. SCOR
3453rd mtg., Mar. 1994, at 3, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (annexing the original
resolution).
22. LIESBETH ZEGVELD,

ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (2002).
23. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 30-52 (James
Crawford et al. eds., 2002).
24. Protocol II, supra note 4, at art. 1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
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confrontation involving a regular national armed force. A
single hostile act or attempted act may provide sufficient basis
... so long as its magnitude or severity rises to the level of an
"armed attack" or an "act of war", or the number, power,
stated intent or organization of the force with which the actor
is associated is such that the act or attempted act is
tantamount to an attack by an armed force. Similarly,
conduct undertaken or organized with knowledge or intent
that it initiate or contribute to such25hostile act or hostilities
would satisfy the nexus requirement.
In other words, if I attack a single Montreal police officer
with the intent to initiate an armed conflict between Frenchspeaking and English-speaking Canadians, there is, according to
the U.S. administration, an armed conflict (and the police may
detain me as an enemy combatant without any judicial
guarantees).
However, until now, terrorist acts by private groups (such as
26
those Jos6 Padilla is alleged to have planned on U.S. territory)
27
have not customarily been viewed as creating armed conflicts.
The United Kingdom stated when it ratified Additional Protocol I:
"[i]t is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term
'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a
kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes
including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation."28
The British and Spanish campaigns against the Irish Republican
Army(IRA) and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) have not been
treated as armed conflicts under IHL.29
Among all the acts that form part of the "war on terrorism"
and the persons detained in that context, we have therefore to
distinguish those covered by IHL of international armed conflicts,

25. Department of Defense, Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military
Commission, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Section 5(C) (Apr. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mci2.pdf (last visited
Apr. 10, 2004).
26. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2nd Cir. 2003).
27. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT 53-54 (I.M.
Sinclair et al. ed., 1993) ("[A]cts of violence committed by private individuals or
groups which are regarded as acts of terrorism ... are outside the scope of 'IHL').
This is also the understanding of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. See The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic (Celebici Camp case),
Judgment, IT-96-21, para. 268 (2001).
28. Reservation by the United Kingdom to Art. 1, para. 4 & Art. 96, para. 3 of
Protocol
I,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/e29be9b3462f48b8cl2563110050c790/Oa9eO3f~f2ee757cc
1256402003fb6d2?OpenDocument (last visited Arp. 10, 2004).
29. See generally HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT 318 (Dartmouth Publishing Co. ed., 1992).
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those covered by IHL of non-international armed conflicts, and
those not covered by IHL.
If IHL applies, each conflict has its own beginning and its
own end. At the end of active hostilities in a given international
armed conflict, prisoners of war (not accused of or sentenced for a
crime) must be repatriated. 30 The detention, e.g., of Taliban
fighters arrested in Afghanistan cannot be prolonged simply
because in the Philippines or in Iraq the "war on terrorism"
continues. 31 While I was told in my Catholic catechism school that
the war against evil will only end on the Day of Judgment, this
cannot mean that the enemies in the U.S. war against evil may be
detained until doomsday.
II. The Legal Status of Persons Held in the "War on
Terrorism"by the United States Under International
Humanitarian Law
A.

Under the Law of InternationalArmed Conflict

In international armed conflicts, there are two categories of
"protected persons," benefiting from two very different legal
regimes: combatants, who become prisoners of war protected by
Convention III if they fall into the power of the enemy, and
civilians protected by Convention IV. Persons who do not fulfill
the nationality or allegiance criteria of "protected persons,"3 2 e.g.,
33
nationals of a detaining power such as John Walker Lindh,
34
benefit only from fundamental guarantees of humane treatment.

30. Convention III, supra note 3, art. 118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224.
31. In Hamdi v.Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2003), the admissibility
of that part of the theory of the administration was left open because hostilities
continued, at the time, in Afghanistan.
32. Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 4 75 U.N.T.S. at 290 ("Persons protected by
the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."). The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) replaces the nationality
standard by an allegiance standard. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 154951,
163-69 (Int'l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber 1999).
See also our criticism in Marco Sass6li & Laura Olson, Prosecutor v. Tadic
(Judgment). Case No IT-94-A. 38ILM 1518 (1999). International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, July 15, 1999, 94 A.J.I.L. 571, 576-77
(2000).
33. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554-58 (E.D. Va. July 11,
2002). Vierucci, supra note 6, at 397, 310, applies the allegiance criteria of the
Tadic decision, and therefore qualifies U.S. nationals fighting against the United
States as protected persons.
34. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38.
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Combatants

Combatants are defined as members of the armed forces of a
party to the international armed conflict. 35 They have a right to
participate actively in hostilities and may not be punished for
doing so, but they may be attacked until they surrender or are
otherwise hors de combat. The specific criteria individuals must
fulfill to be granted combatant status differ depending upon
whether only Convention III applies, whether Protocol I also
applies, and whether they are members of regular forces or
As neither the United States nor
resistance movements. 36
Afghanistan is a party to Protocol I, I discuss hereafter only the
criteria to be fulfilled under Convention III. The United States
argues that the Taliban, who are members of the armed forces of
the de facto government of Afghanistan, "have not effectively
distinguished themselves from the civilian population of
Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their operations
37
Under such
in accordance with the laws and customs of war."

conditions, a person is indeed denied prisoner of war status-and
implicitly combatant status-if he or she is a member of "other
militias . . . [or] volunteer corps, including those of resistance
Such conditions, however, are not explicitly
movements." 38
prescribed for the "members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict."39 There are good reasons to view the Taliban as
belonging to the latter category. Requiring from regular armed
forces respect of the laws of war as a precondition to obtaining
combatant and prisoner of war status could endanger such forces.
In all armed conflicts, the enemy is accused of not complying with
If
IHL, and such accusations are all too often accurate.
accusations of IHL violations by regular armed forces were
permitted to deprive all their members of their prisoner of war
status, independently of whether the individual member to be
classified complied with the laws of war, prisoner of war status
35. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 43(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 and art. 1 of the
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of.War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
in., THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 107 (James

Brown Scott ed., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 1918).
36. See Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40; Protocol I,
supra note 2, arts. 43, 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23-24.
37. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement by the Press
Secretary on the Geneva - Convention (May 7, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Statement on the Geneva Convention].
38. Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(2), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
39. Id., at art. 4(A)(1), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
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could frequently have little or no protective effect. Historically,
the United States never invoked such an argument concerning the
German Wehrmacht, which cannot be claimed to have regularly
complied with the laws of war.
As for the Al-Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan,
denying them combatant and prisoner of war status may be
justified either because they did not belong to a party to the
international armed conflict, or, if they are considered to be
members of an Afghan militia, it is highly doubtful whether they
complied with the aforementioned conditions such members must
fulfill.40
When doubt exists regarding whether persons who
committed a belligerent act are combatants, Convention III
prescribes that they must be treated as prisoners of war "until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal."41 The United States established such tribunals in the
Vietnam War 42 and in the 1991 Gulf War,43 but argues that in the
case of those detained in Guantinamo, there is no doubt. 44 If the
clause applied only when the detaining power has doubts, the
latter could always escape from its obligation, which would make
45
the clause practically useless.
If a person fallen into the power of the enemy is determined
to be a combatant, he or she is a prisoner of war. Prisoners of war
may be interned, not as a punishment, but to hinder them from
rejoining the fighting. Therefore no individual decision has to be
taken on the detention. The simple fact that someone is an enemy
combatant is reason enough to justify his or her detention until
the end of active hostilities in that conflict. While in detention,
prisoners of war benefit however from a detailed regime of
treatment ensuring that they are treated not only humanely, but

40. See Vierucci, supra note 6, at 292-95 (discussing the requirements for
prisoner of war status).
41. Convention III, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
42. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directives No. 38146, Military Intelligence: Combined Screening of Detainees, 27 Dec. 1967,
reproduced in SASS6LI & BOUVIER, supranote 2, at 780-83.
43. U. S. DEPT. DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR, reproduced in 31 I.L.M. 612, 629 (1992).
44. See Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Budget Testimony-Senate Armed Services
Committee (2002) (testimony by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), available
(last visited
at http://www.defenselink.millspeeches/2002/s2OO20205-secdef4.html
Apr. 10, 2002).
45. Cf. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 69-70 (1833) ("It is one of the
admitted rules of construction, that interpretations which lead to an absurdity, or
render an act null, are to be avoided.").
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also not as prison inmates, 46 unless they are prosecuted or
sentenced. Except in the latter case, they are not serving a
sentence and have committed no unlawful act.
2.

Civilians

Civilians are "protected civilians" (a term of art of Convention
IV) if they fall during an international armed conflict, either on an
occupied territory or on enemy territory, into the hands of a State
of which they are not nationals. 47 Enemy nationals are always
protected. In an occupied territory, third-party nationals other
than nationals of an ally of the occupier are equally protected; on a
party's own territory, only neutral third-party nationals are
protected, and only if they do not benefit from normal diplomatic
protection. 48 Civilians may not directly participate in hostilities
and are protected against attacks. Protected civilians may be
detained only for two reasons: first, under domestic legislation for
the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses (including for
direct participation in hostilities); second, civilians may be
interned for imperative security reasons, upon individual decision
made in a regular procedure, which has to be prescribed by the
belligerent concerned, and must include a right of appeal. 49 Such
civilians are civil internees whose treatment is governed by
extremely detailed provisions of Convention IV and whose cases
50
must be reviewed every six months.
3.

"Unlawful Combatants"?

While the United States complied with those rules pertaining
to combatants and civilians in the war in Iraq, the United States
respects neither of them in (other parts of) the "war on
terrorism."5 1 The justification given by the administration is that
"terrorists" who have fallen into the hands of the U.S. are
"unlawful combatants" and as such are neither protected by
Convention III nor by Convention V. U.S. President Bush himself
makes this argument concerning the status of Taliban fighters
captured in Afghanistan (a situation that is indeed covered by the

46. Convention III, supra note 3, art. 22, para 1, 75 U.N.T.S. at 154.
47. See Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
48. See id. art 4, para. 2.
49. Id. arts. 41-43, 78.
50. See id. arts. 79-135.
51. Whether the war against Iraq is or is not part of the "war on terrorism" is
unclear to me. For my purposes it is sufficient to note that the United States does
not invoke the interpretation of IHL I criticize in this article concerning Iraq.
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law of international armed conflicts) 52 and later held at a U.S.
military base in Guantinamo, Cuba. 53 Other administration
officials make the same argument concerning the war against Al54
Qaeda and others labeled as "terrorists.
I argue that according to the text, context, and aim of
Conventions III and IV, no one can fall in between the two
55
Conventions and therefore be protected by neither of the two.
The first paragraph of Article 4 of Convention IV reads as
follows: "[plersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."56
According to paragraph four of that article, persons protected by
Convention III "shall not be considered as protected persons
within the meaning of the present Convention."57 This clearly
indicates that anyone who is not protected by Convention III falls
under Convention IV (if he or she fulfills the requirement for
protected person statusS5 ). The Commentary published by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reads:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under

52. See Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
53. See, e.g., Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service,
Geneva Convention Applies to Taliban, not Al Qaeda, Feb. 7, 2002, available at
Statement
http://www.defenselink.mil/news[Feb2002/n02072002_200202074.html;
on the Geneva Convention, supranote 37.
54. See Dworkin, supra note 6 (interviewing Deputy General Counsel for
International Affairs); Padilla Respondents' Response, supra note 6. Courts have
accepted this line of argument. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541,
552-58 (E.D.Va. 2002). See generally Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational
Interpretation in IrrationalTimes: The Third Geneva Convention and the "War on
Terror," 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 301 (2003); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert,
"Unlawful Combatants" or 'Prisonersof War" The Law and Politics of Labels, 36
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 59, 81 (2003); Paust, supra note 6; Gabor Rona, Interesting
Times for InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Challenges from the "War on Terror,"
27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 55 (2003); Vierucci, supra note 6; Richard
J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay: The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole," HUMAN RIGHTS
2,
available
at
BRIEF,
Spring
2003
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/10/3detainees.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
of
Dormann,
The
Legal
Situation
55. See
generally
Knut
"Unlawful/Unpriviledged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003);
Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 328, 344 (1951) (stating that "unlawful
combatants" are protected by Convention IV). When the concept of "unlawful
combatants" was used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex Parte Quirin et al., 317
U.S. 1 (1942), Convention IV did not yet exist.
56. Convention IV, supranote 3, art. 4, para. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
57. Id. art. 4, para. 4.
58. See supra note 32.
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international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such,
covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the
Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First
Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy
hands can be outside the law. We feel that that is a
satisfactory solution-not only satisfying to the mind, but also,
all, satisfactory from the humanitarian point of
and above
59
view.
The drafting history of the article confirms this interpretation.
The XVIIth International Red Cross Conference criticized the
wording suggested by the ICRC that referred to "persons who take
no active part in hostilities" because "[t]his phrasing did not,
however, cover those who commit hostile acts whilst not being
60
This
regular combatants, such as saboteurs and franc-tireurs."
problem was reported to the Diplomatic Conference, which
proceeded to adopt the present wording.
Moreover, Article 5 of Convention IV, allowing for some
derogation from the protective regime of that Convention for
persons engaged in hostile activities,6 1 would not have been
necessary, if such persons did not fall within Convention IV.
It may appear strange to classify heavily armed "terrorists"
captured in an international armed conflict, but found not to
benefit from combatant and prisoner of war status, 62 as "civilians."
In law, however, borderline cases never correspond to the ideal
type of a category and nevertheless fall under its provisions. What
counts is that such "civilian status" does not lead to absurd
results. As "civilians," unprivileged combatants may be attacked
while they unlawfully participate in hostilities. 63 After arrest,
Convention IV does not bar their punishment for unlawful
participation in hostilities; it even prescribes such punishment for
war crimes.6 4 In addition, it permits administrative detention for
59. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean S.

Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin et al. trans., 1958).
60. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REVISED AND NEW DRAFT CONVENTIONS FOR
THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, REMARKS AND PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE

ICRC 68 (1949).
61. See Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
62. If the "terrorists" fail to fulfill the conditions set up by Article 4 of Convention
III, e.g., belonging to a resistance movement which does not distinguish itself from
the civilian population, or because their group does not belong to a party to the
international conflict, they would be found not to have benefited from combatant
and prisoner of war status.
63. See Protocol I, supra note 2, at art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
64. Convention IV, supra note 3, at art.64, 146 75 U.N.T.S. at 328; id. at art. 146,
75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
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imperative security reasons 65 and it allows for derogations from
a
protected substantive rights of civilians within the territory of 66
State and from communication rights within occupied territory.
Convention IV was not drafted by professional do-gooders or
professors, but by experienced diplomats and military leaders,
fully taking into account the security needs of a State confronted
with dangerous people.
Applying Convention IV to persons captured in Afghanistan
who are neither combatants nor U.S. citizens produces two
consequences clearly at variance with the treatment that the
United States purportedly 67 offers in Guantinamo. First, there
needs to be an individual decision on their status and detention
and that decision must be periodically reviewed. 68 Second, they
may not be held in Guantanimo, but must rather be interned in
Afghanistan. 69 While combatants may be held as prisoners of war
in every corner of the earth, civilians may not be deported out of
an occupied territory. 70 Afghanistan was an occupied territory
because it came under U.S. and coalition control during an
international armed conflict. Could not the security of the United
States be assured if those persons were held and questioned on
Afghan territory, and if the decision to intern them had to be made
according to a regular procedure prescribed by the United States
and regularly reviewed?
Surprisingly and much to my relief, the Legal Adviser of the
U.S. State Department has recently admitted that "unlawful
combatants" are protected by Convention V.71 However, the
administration has yet to draw practical conclusions from this
admission as it does not yet apply the laws that necessarily follow
and continues to detain those persons in Guantfnamo, denying
them individual judicial or administrative determinations of the
justification for their detentions.

65. See supranote 49 and accompanying text.
66. Convention IV, supranote 3, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
67. The U.S. does not claim that such people may be tortured or be treated
inhumanely. See sources cited, supra note 53.
68. See Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 43, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16; id. art. 78, 75
U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
69. See Convention IV, supra note 3, at art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318-20; id. art 76.,
75 U.N.T.S. at 336.
70. See Convention IV, supra note 3, at art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318-20; id. art 76.,
75 U.N.T.S. at 336.
71. William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient
Features, 28 YALE. J. INT'L L. 319, 321 (2003) (referring to Article 64 of Convention IV,
which is located in the part of Convention IV covering protected civilians in occupied
territories).
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Some may find it shocking that while captured lawful
combatants, i.e., prisoners of war, may be interned without any
judicial or individual administrative
decision, "unlawful
combatants" as civilians may be detained only for imperative
However, lawful
security reasons or in view of a trial 7 2
combatants can be easily identified, based on objective criteria,
which they will normally not deny (i.e., being a member in the
armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict), while
the membership and past behavior of an unprivileged combatant
and the future threat he or she represents can only be determined
individually.
From a humanitarian perspective, it is dangerous to revive
such an easy escape category for detaining powers as "unlawful
combatants." One wonders how a detaining power will avoid
indefinite detention without trial, which is the most difficult
challenge for anyone in charge of a place of detention. Reports of
numerous suicide attempts in Guant~namo and of the very
delicate psychiatric state of health of its inmates are not
7
surprising. 3
As a lawyer, it is important to me that no one falls outside
the law and in particular not outside IHL, which is the minimum
safety net in a profoundly inhumane situation that is war, in
which most of the other legal safeguards tend to disappear. The
United States has declared that it will treat all captured
"terrorists" humanely.7 4 First, such a vague commitment is
insufficient. The law covers even those who commit the most
horrible crimes; only this allows us to pass judgment over them.
Second, other, less scrupulous States may take advantage of such
a new loophole in the carefully constructed protective system
offered by the Geneva Conventions by, for example, denying
protection to U.S. personnel.
B.

Under the Law of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts

IHL of non-international armed conflicts foresees no prisoner
of war status, contains no other rules on the status of persons
detained in relation to the conflict, or reasons justifying detention
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Associated Press, Suicide Attempts at Guantdnamo Reach 32 (Aug.
26, 2003), cited in LAWYERS COMM. FOR Hum. RTS., ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 53, 108
(2003).

74. Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper, Remarks at the Chatham House on
Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaida Detainees (Feb. 20, 2002), at
http:l/www.state.gov/s/wci/rmi2002/849l.htm.
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of civilians.7 5 Therefore, it cannot possibly be seen as a sufficient
legal basis for detaining anyone. Everyone may be detained under
domestic legislation, as far as it is compatible with international
human rights law. Under IHL, he or she simply benefits from
guarantees of humane treatment and, if prosecuted for criminal
offences, from judicial guarantees.
C.

OutsideArmed Conflicts

IHL applies only to armed conflicts.7 6 It cannot therefore
offer any protection to those held in connection with those
components of the "war on terrorism" that do not meet the
threshold of either international or non-international armed
conflict. It is evident that IHL provides even less of a legal basis
for detaining such persons.
III. Who May Be Targeted?
Inevitably, IHL tolerates that combatants kill each other in
wartime, which would never be tolerated by international human
rights law or any domestic legislation in peacetime. Combatants
may be targeted as long as they do not surrender and do not
otherwise fall "hors de combat."77 Civilians who unlawfully take a
direct part in hostilities lose their protection against attacks for as
long as they directly participate.78 Commentators dispute both
what "direct participation in the hostilities" is, and how long a
civilian participating loses immunity from attack.7 9 The ICRC is
75. See sources cited supra note 4 (omitting any discussion of the admissible
reasons for detaining persons in non-international armed conflict).
76. See supranotes 14-29 and accompanying text.
77. Protocol I, supra note 2, at art. 41, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 22; id. art. 48., 1125
U.N.T.S. at 25.
78. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
79. See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 484 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (defining
"direct participation in hostilities" as committing harmful or espionage acts); Frits
Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 300, 311-12
(Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991) (arguing the loss of civilian immunity is limited
to the length of participation in hostilities and the participation being an act that
causes actual harm); Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 209, 232-33 (Dieter
Fleck ed., 1995) (construing participation to include preparation for and intent to
engage in military operations but not extending to employees in armament
factories); Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United State Crossing
the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 117 (2001) (stating that activities traditionally
engaged in by civilians are not "direct participation in the hostilities"); Lisa L.
Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 21
(2001) (arguing that U.S. civilians perform acts that could make them direct
participants in hostilities).
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presently holding expert consultations on both questions, possibly
in view of drawing up lists of what clearly constitutes direct
participation in hostilities, what clearly does not fall under that
concept, and what remains in a grey zone. My view on both
questions is that any analogy to the situation of members of armed
forces should be avoided. The fact that members of regular armed
forces (who may be attacked) normally perform a certain activity
(e.g., cooking for combatants) does not mean that civilians who
undertake such activity are directly participating in hostilities.
What counts is the immediate impact on the enemy. As for the
duration of the loss of protection, one should not deduce from the
fact that combatants may be attacked until they are hors de
combat, that civilians who are suspected of planning to participate
directly in hostilities, or who could resume a previous participation
are legitimate targets. Otherwise, the whole civilian population
would be placed in jeopardy, as such civilians cannot be
distinguished, unlike members of the armed forces, from the rest
of the civilian population. What is needed are easily applicable
and factually-based criteria that can be readily established in the
heat of battle.
Everyone who is neither combatant nor civilian directly
participating in hostilities is a civilian benefiting from the
protection provided by the law governing the conduct of hostilities.
In case of doubt, a person must be considered to be a civilian and
he or she may not be targeted.8 0 Together, in the law on the
conduct of hostilities, the categories of civilians and combatants
complement one another: in effect avoiding circumstances where
some people may fight but may not be fought against, or where
others may be attacked but may not-and do not-defend
themselves.
Such privilege or disadvantage would never be
respected and would undermine the whole fabric of IHL in a given
conflict.
One of the dangerous effects of the U.S. characterization of
the "war on terrorism" as a single global international armed
conflict is that, if correct, such classification makes deliberate
attacks upon members of the "enemy armed forces" lawful
worldwide.8 1 The United States considers any member of a
terrorist group as an "enemy combatant" who may be attacked.
Thus, the United States justified an unmanned missile strike that

80. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
81. Anthony Dworkin, The Yemen Strike: The War on Terrorism Goes Global,
CRIMES OF WAR, Nov. 14, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/newsyemen.html.
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82
hit and killed suspected members of A1-Qaeda in Yemen.
Without this qualification under the laws of war, such targeted
assassinations not preceded by an attempt to arrest the persons
concerned would be classified as extra-judicial executions, which

would seriously violate international human rights law.8 3

The

latter accepts the deliberate killing of even the worst criminal only
Fortunately (for
under the most extreme circumstances. 8 4
inhabitants of countries of the North), the United States applies
its theory only selectively and does not target suspected members
of terrorist groups in the United States, Canada, or Germany by
aerial attacks or targeted assassinations. If fully applied, this
theory would have justified, subject to the principle of
proportionality, an ambush attack on Jos6 Padilla when he left his
plane at a Chicago airport or at his grandmother's birthday party.
U.S. administration officials have indeed implied that the
President's claimed authority to designate as an enemy combatant
any individual, including a U.S. citizen within the United States,
includes authority to carry out extra-judicial executions, within or
outside the United States, of suspects so designated.8 5 Under the
laws of war, if those persons were combatants, such claims would
be correct. This absurd result, permitting targeted assassinations
in the midst of peaceful cities, proves once more that all those
suspected to be "terrorists" cannot be classified as combatants.

82. David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for
Suspects; Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2002, at A16; Dworkin, supra note 81.
83. Press Release, Amnesty International, Yemen/USA: Government Must Not
at
2002)
8,
(Nov.
Executions
Extra-Judicial
Sanction
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511682002?open&of=ENG-USA
(last visited Feb. 29, 2004). The Late foreign minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh, also
classified that attack as a summary execution. Press Cuttings, PALESTINIAN TIMES,
at
available
2002,
24,
Nov.
CHI.
TRIB.,
from
reprinted
http://www.ptimes.org/issue138/pcuttings.html (last visited Apr. 10 2004).
84. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 Aug. to 7
Sept. 1990, art. 9, referred to by Report of the Eighth United Nations, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.1/28, at 121 (1990) (prohibiting law enforcement officials from using
it is in self-defense), available at
against people unless
firearms
Under Article 8 of those
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/h-comp43.htm.
principles, no derogation is admissible, even in times of emergency. Id., art. 8.
85. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 73, at 71.
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IV. The Relationship Between International Humanitarian
Law, International Human Rights Law, and Domestic
Law
IHL first developed as the law of international armed
conflicts and was therefore necessarily international law in the
traditional sense: an objective legal order governing interstate
relations. Its main objective, to protect individuals, was not
expressed in the form of subjective rights of the victims but was a
consequence of the rules of behavior for States. Human rights
have only recently become protected by international law. They
were always formulated as subjective rights of individuals (and,
more recently, of groups) against the State-mainly their own
State. Because of the philosophical axiom driving them, they
apply to everyone everywhere. As they are concerned with all
aspects of human life, human rights have a much greater impact
on public opinion and international politics than IHL, which is
applicable only in armed conflicts, a situation to be avoided.
Human rights-like thinking therefore increasingly influences IHL.
If one translates the protective rules of IHL into rights and
compares these rights with the ones provided by international
human rights law, it becomes apparent that IHL protects only
those human rights that are particularly endangered by armed
conflicts, and are compatible with the very nature of armed
conflicts. 8 6 These few rights are protected by much more detailed
regulations adapted to the specific problems arising in armed
conflicts than the comprehensive guarantees formulated in
international human rights law.8 7 In addition, IHL regulates
some issues that are vital for the protection of victims of armed
conflicts, but which human rights law fails to address, even
implicitly.8 8 Conversely, on certain issues, such as the precise
content of judicial guarantees, the rules applicable to the use of
firearms by law enforcement officials, medical ethics, or the
definition of torture, human rights law and the jurisprudence of its
international enforcement bodies are more detailed.

86. E.g., Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 41, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 22 (protecting the
right to life of enemies [begin ital] hors de combat [end ital]); id. art. 56, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 28-29 (protecting the right to a health environment); Convention IV,
supra note 3, art. 56, 75 U.N.T.S. 176-78 (protecting the right to health of
inhabitants of occupied territories).
87. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. 29 (detailing rules of
behavior for those conducting hostilities, which essentially translates the right to
life and physical integrity into those detailed rules).
88. E.g., id. art. 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23-24 (stating who may use force, which is
not an issue addressed by human rights law but is necessary to protect civilians).
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Most human rights, except the most fundamental ones
belonging to "the hard core," may be derogated from in times of
emergency, to the extent required by the exigencies of the
situation, and if this derogation is consistent with other
international obligations of the derogating State.8 9 IHL contains
some of those "other international obligations." Therefore, when
confronted in times of armed conflict with derogations admissible
under human rights instruments, the enforcement bodies of
international human rights law must determine whether those
measures are compatible with IHL. 90 If they are not, they also
violate international human rights law.
International human rights law considers the right to life as
non-derogable, even in time of armed conflict. There is however,
in some instruments an explicit 9 1-and in all others an implicitexception for "lawful acts of war." IHL declares what is lawful in
war. When confronted with State-sponsored killings in time of
armed conflict, human rights courts, commissions, or NGOs must
therefore check whether such actions are consistent with IHL
before they can know whether those actions violate international
human rights law.
In case of armed conflict, both IHL and those provisions of
international human rights law that cannot be or are not
suspended apply simultaneously. IHL can be understood as a lex
specialis where it is more detailed, 92 but only on issues dealt with
by both branches. Thus, in an international armed conflict, the
detailed rules of Convention III on the treatment of prisoners of
war are a lex specialis concerning their freedom of movement,
their right to be treated humanely, their right to family life, their
right to work, and their right to health. 93 The same is true for the
detailed rules of Convention IV on the treatment of civil

89. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
OAS Treaty Series No. 36, art. 27(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter
ICCPR]; Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, art. 15(1) (limited
derogations from human rights permissible in time of public emergency).
90. General Comment No. 29, in Report of the Human Rights Committee, para.
3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) (commenting on Article 4 of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights relating to states of
emergency).
91. E.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 89, at art. 15(2).
92. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at
para. 25.
93. See generally Convention III, supranote 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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internees. 94 On the treatment of civilians being detained pre-trial
or serving a sentence, the law on occupied territories contains only
a general rule 95 and the law applicable to a party's own territory
foresees no specific rule at all. On these issues, therefore, human
rights law must prevail (but may be suspended to the extent
necessary to tackle a threat to the life of the nation).
As for the reasons justifying a deprivation of liberty,
Convention III implies that enemy combatants may be interned as
prisoners of war for the simple reason that they are combatants,
without any individual judicial or administrative decision. 96 This
title justifying detention prevails, as lex specialis for combatants,
over human rights law and domestic law requiring an individual
judicial determination. The legal situation of civilians is more
complex. Convention IV permits the administrative detention of
an individual protected civilian for imperative reasons of security,
97
It
upon the individual decision of an administrative board.
9s
prescribes a right of appeal and a review every six months. In an
occupied territory the decision must be "made according to a
regular procedure prescribed by the Occupying Power." 99 On a
belligerent's own territory, it may be argued that domestic
legislation is necessary as the basis of detention as well, because
IHL only limits the rights of belligerents on their territory, but
does not enable them to do what they could otherwise not do. This
is even less doubtful for civilians in pre-trial detention. On a
detaining party's own territory, Convention IV provides for no
specific judicial guarantees. Here, human rights law is the lex
specialis and any arrest must be based on domestic legislation. 100
In an occupied territory, a person may either be detained based on
local legislation or on legislation introduced by the Occupying
Power to protect its security, to fulfill its IHL obligations or to
maintain an orderly government. 101
In non-international armed conflicts, IHL contains human
rights-like provisions on the humane treatment of all persons

94. See generally Convention TV, supranote 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
95. Convention IV,supra note 3, at art. 76, 75 U.N.T.S. at 336.
96. Convention III, supra note 3, art. 21, 75 U.N.T.S. at 152-54; see supra Part
III(A)(1).
97. Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 43, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16; id. art. 78, 75
U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
98. Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 43, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16; id. art. 78, para.
2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
99. Convention IV,supra note 3, art. 78, para. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
100. ICCPR, supra note 89, at art. 9.
101. Convention V, supra note 3, art. 64, para 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 328.
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affected by the conflict, 1 2 more specific ones benefiting persons
whose liberty has been restricted,10 3 and judicial guarantees
04
applicable to the prosecution of offenses related to the conflict.
It does not contain any provision on the possible reasons for arrest,
detention, or internment. These issues are therefore entirely
governed by domestic legislation and human rights law requiring
such a domestic legal basis and limiting the possible reasons for
arrest, detention, or internment. As there is no combatant status
under IHL of non-international armed conflicts, the debate about
the possibility of detaining unlawful combatants does not even
arise. No one can be deprived of his or her liberty except based on
the law. 0 5 In State practice too, governments confronted by noninternational armed conflicts have based the arrest, detention, or
internment of rebels, including rebel fighters, either on domestic
criminal law or on special security legislation introduced during
the conflict. They have never invoked the "law of war."
Based on the understanding of the relationship between IHL
and human rights law suggested above, it is astonishing that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has accepted that a
U.S. citizen captured during active hostilities in Afghanistan,
Yaser Esam Hamdi, may be detained as an "enemy combatant,"
contrary to federal legislation, 10 6 and deprived of U.S.
constitutional rights, simply based on a presidential order, falling
within the constitutional powers of the President as Commander
in Chief. 0 7 A federal district court accepted the same for Jos6
Padilla, although he is not even alleged to have ever been in
Afghanistan or any other theatre of active hostilities, 08 but this
has been overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. 0 9 The Fourth Circuit, contrary to the Second Circuit,
considered Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force o

102. Convention 1, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Convention II, supra
note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 86-88; Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S
at 136-38; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S at 288-90.; Protocol II,
supranote 4, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 8.
103. Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 8.
104. Convention I, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(d), 75 U.N.T.S. at 34; Convention II,
supra note 3, art. 3(1)(d), 75 U.N.T.S at 88; Convention III, supra note 3, art.
3(1)(d), 75 U.N.T.S at 138; Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(d), 75 U.N.T.S at
90.; Protocol II, supra note 4, at art. 6, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14.
105. IICPR, supra note 89, at art. 9.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
107. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002).
108. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
109. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
110. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
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after September 11, 2001 as statutory authorization for this
policy.111 Even more astonishingly, the Fourth Circuit added that
Congress has appropriated funding to the Department of Defense
to pay for expenses incurred in connection with "the maintenance,
pay, and allowances of prisoners of war [and] other persons in the
custody of the Army, navy or Air Force whose status is determined
1 2
. .to be similar to prisoners of war."
By funding the detention
of "prisoners of war" and persons "similar to prisoners of war," the
court argues, Congress has authorized the military detention of
3
enemy combatants."
Concerning "unlawful combatants" held in Guantdnamo, I
cannot judge whether U.S. courts are competent to determine their
status." 4 As those persons are, however, under U.S. jurisdiction,
U.S. human rights obligations apply.'1 5 This has been recognized
by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.116 As for the
persons who have fallen into the hands of the United States
during an armed conflict, which is the case for all of the
Guantinamo detainees, according to the United States (while, as
mentioned above, I have considerable doubts and consider that
distinctions have to be made), IHL applies. Both branches require,
except for prisoners of war, a domestic legal basis for such
*

(Sept. 18, 2001).
111. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S.Ct. 981 (2004).
112. Id. at 467 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2002)).
113. Id. at 467-68.
The government also argued this point in Padilla
Respondents' Response supra note 6 at 35.
114. Denied in Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D. C. Cir. 2003) (finding
U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees), but affirmed in Gherebi
v.Bush, No. 03-55785, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25928 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003).
115. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for
example, a State party undertakes to respect and ensure the rights foreseen by the
Covenant "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."
ICCPR, supra note 89, art. 2(1). Commentators convincingly argue that to avoid
absurd results, this provision may only be interpreted as creating a disjunctive
conjunction between "within its territory" and "subject to its jurisdiction." Thus,
they maintain that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies
as well to territories occupied by State parties to the Covenant.
Thomas
Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTs 73-77 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981). U.N. practice also dictates application of the Covenant to territories occupied
by States parties. Walter Kilin, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation at
55-59, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1992/26 (Jan. 16,
1992).
116. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Decision on the Request for
Precautionary Measures, Detainees on the Guantdnamo Base, Mar. 12, 2002,
reprintedin 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002).
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detention. 117 In Guantdnamo, only the United States could create
such a basis. On November 13, 2001, President Bush adopted a
military order allowing the United States to detain any non-citizen
if the President finds "reason to believe that such individual...
has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore," that
could harm the United States. 1 8 It is, however, doubtful whether
such an order can be considered "law" (within the meaning of
international human rights law), and whether such individual
presidential orders have not been issued for most persons held in
Guant~namo.
Conclusion: Do We Need a New Law for the "War on
Terrorism"?
Once the existing regime has been described, the question
arises as to whether it must and can be revised. I have tried to
argue that "terrorists" captured in Afghanistan or Iraq can be
dealt with under IHL of international armed conflicts, which
provides in certain respects for a lex specialis and for different and
more appropriate legal protections as compared with the normal
rules of international human rights law and domestic law. Those
captured elsewhere must perforce find themselves on the territory
of a State (or on a ship registered in a State). If that State does
not oppose the U.S. "war on terrorism," and the captured persons
are not nationals or members of armed forces of a State engaged in
an armed conflict with the United States, the law of international
armed conflicts does not apply. Depending on the intensity of the
hostilities in the territory of that State, the law of noninternational armed conflicts may apply. This law provides for
some protective rules that go beyond the non-derogable core of
international human rights law and possibly beyond many
domestic laws. However, it does not enable States to derogate
from their domestic laws so as to justify acts those laws prohibit.
Finally, on the territory of some States involved in the "war on
Fortunately, on the
terrorism," there is no armed conflict.
territory of the United States of America, for instance, there is no
non-international armed conflict. In such situations, the "war" can
and must be fought with the means of law enforcement and
international human rights law. IHL has no role to play.
Some may be unsatisfied with this need to split the conflict

117. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
118. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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legally into several sub-categories to which different rules apply (a
phenomenon not unfamiliar to lawyers) and the differences
between the legal regimes applicable to captured Al-Qaeda
members captured in Afghanistan, the Philippines, or
Minneapolis. In addition, the law of non-international armed
conflicts may appear in certain respects inappropriate for a transnational conflict between a State and a global non-State actor
since such law was designed for conflicts occurring within a
country, mainly between the government and rebels, and its rules
accord much consideration for the sovereignty of the State
Conceptually, one might consider that in the
concerned.
aforementioned trans-national conflicts a higher level of protection
should be possible as opposed to a conflict occurring in the
territory of only one State and fought between government and
rebel forces, where the sovereignty of that State is an obstacle to
greater protection.
It may be that a law specific to such trans-national armed
conflicts could be elaborated. After every major war, IHL has been
revised to adapt it to changing military and technological realities
and to cover new humanitarian problems and additional categories
of victims. 119 In recent years, the focus has been on adding new
However, any revision
mechanisms for implementation.
introduces the risk that States will take advantage of it to weaken
rather than to strengthen their obligations and the corresponding
rights of the war victims. The result of any revision has until now
been a treaty, which binds only those States formally accepting
1 21
it.120 The United States has still not ratified the 1977 Protocols.
It is doubtful whether a new law for trans-national conflicts, as it
should necessarily also give some rights to the non-State actors
involved, would be acceptable to the United States and whether
such a law would be accepted and respected in the future by other
States involved in such conflicts. It is even more doubtful as to
how such a new law could be binding on, and whether it would be
respected by, groups such as A1-Qaeda. 122 A new law would also
119. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 A.J.I.L. 239,
242-47 (2000).
120. For a post-modern process not aimed at new treaty rules, but at actionoriented research, informal discussions with governments and possibly "new
interpretations," see Harvard University, Program on Humanitarian Policy and
Conflict Research, Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and
(IHL),
at
Humanitarian
Law
of
International
Development
http://www.hsph.harvard.edulhpcrlihlresearch-meeting.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
122. See Marco Sass6li, Armed Groups Project, Possible Legal Mechanisms to
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inevitably create a third category of armed conflicts, adding to the
existing difficulties in classifying situations under the laws of war.
If that new law diminished the protection offered to prisoners in
such conflicts, would it apply to both sides, or would it abandon
the age-old principle of equality of the belligerents before the laws
of war?123 If the latter is the purpose, who believes that those
qualified as "terrorists" will respect that new law?
As with all laws, the laws of war can and must adapt to new
developments. However, no law can be adapted in every new case
of application to fit with the results desired by those (or some of
those) involved. As part of international law, and pending a
Copernican revolution of the Westphalian system, the law must, in
addition, be the same for all States. To see it only as a means, to
be immediately adapted to new claims, 124 or to apply it selectively
undermines the predictability and therefore the normative force
that defines legal rules.

Improve Compliance by Armed Groups with InternationalHumanitarianLaw and
Law,
at
Rights
Human
International
http://www.armedgroups.org/ media/Sassoli%20Armed%/20Groups%20paper.doc
(last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
123. See supra note 2.
124. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War,
97 A.J.I.L. 82 (2003).

